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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 






BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of attempted aggravated arson, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-103 (1999) and 76-4-101 (1999), in the 
Eighth Judicial District Court, Duchesne County, Utah, the Honorable John R. Anderson 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
(1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Did defendant's trial counsel render ineffective assistance by not 
calling unidentified witnesses to testify at trial and by making strategic trial decisions? 
Standard of Review: Ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal are 
reviewed as a matter of law. State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
Issue No. 2: Was the evidence sufficient to prove that defendant committed 
attempted aggravated arson where the evidence shows that defendant was at the scene 
near the time the fire started, that he had a motive to start the fire, that he threatened to 
start the fire after purchasing a small amount of gasoline in a coffee cup, and that the fire 
was ignited using gasoline? 
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, 
after viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to 
the verdict, [it] findfs] that the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or 
was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust." 
State v. Silva, 2000 UT App 292,113,13 P.3d 604 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are found in the Addenda. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-101 (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with attempted aggravated arson, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-103 (1999) and 76-4-101 (1999). 
R. 9-10. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R. 85-87; 110; 111. The trial court 
sentenced defendant to a statutory indeterminate prison term of one to fifteen years. R. 
88-94. Defendant timely appealed his conviction to the Utah Supreme Court. R. 95-96. 
2 
Pursuant to rule 44, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Supreme Court transferred 
defendant's appeal to this Court. R. 106. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1 
In the evening of April 11, 2001, defendant entered the Wells Club, a private club 
of which he was a member, and announced that he had just lost his job. R. 111:12-13. 
Defendant appeared to be a little intoxicated, very upset, and agitated, R. 111:13,17. He 
immediately attempted to pick fights with the three other club patrons, claiming that they 
had contributed to his job loss. R. 111:13. The bartender, Kristy Andrews, warned 
defendant several times that if he did not stop his behavior he would be asked to leave. R. 
111:13. Defendant continued to harass the other club members, and was asked to leave. 
Id. Defendant refused to go. Id. Andrews told defendant that "if [he left] now, [he 
could] come back tomorrow when [he was] feeling betterf,] and pointed out that "if [he 
was] not going to leave and [she had] to have [him] removed, [he could] never come 
back." R. 111:13-14. Defendant ignored Andrews until she picked up the telephone to 
call the police. R. 111:14. 
Still extremely upset and agitated, defendant exited the Wells Club and went 
across the street toward the Bonanza gas station. R. 111:14-15. While on the opposite 
side of the street, defendant began jumping up and down making obscene hand gestures 
toward Andrews and the others inside the club. R. 111:14-15,22-23. At Bonanza, 
defendant filled a coffee cup with 45 cents worth of gasoline and entered the service 
'The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92 
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station to pay for it. R. 111:24-26. While inside, defendant, who was visibly upset, told 
Tracy Lyons, the gas station attendant, that he had just been "86ed" or ousted from the 
Wells Club. R. 111:26-27. As he walked out the door, defendant told Lyons uto watch, 
[and] in 45 minutes it's going to go up in smoke/' R. 111:26, 30. Defendant was visibly 
upset. R. 111:26-27. Lyons watched defendant walk across the street and around the 
back of the bank building adjacent to the Wells Club, carrying what appeared to be the 
gasoline he had just purchased. R. 111:26-27,30,33-37,44. Concerned, Lyons 
telephoned the Wells Club. R. 111:27, 50-51. 
A short time later, Richard Kent and Lynda Bake were dining in Kent's apartment 
overlooking the back of the Wells Club, when they noticed flames shooting up the club's 
back wall. R. 111:38-42,52-57. Kent and Bake watched as the fire intermittently flared 
up three times. R. 111:53, 55. As they were about to call the fire department, the flames 
went out R. 111:39, 55-56. It was dark outside and they did not see anyone near the 
back of the club. R. 111:40-41, 54, 57. 
Officer Mark Nielsen investigated the matter later that night. R. 111:59-60, 66-67. 
Upon examining the back of the club building, Officer Nielsen noticed that a metal 
garbage can which was usually wired to a small fence ten feet away from the back of the 
club had been untied and placed against the club's back wall. R. 111:59, 62, 67-68, 75. 
The inside of the garbage can was charred and scorch marks appeared above the can on 
the club wall. R. 111:62-65. A strong odor of gasoline emanated from inside the garbage 
can. R. 111:65. 
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After interviewing Andrews and Lyons, Officer Nielsen unsuccessfully attempted 
several times to locate defendant at his residence and his work. R. 111:65, 76. The next 
night, the officer found defendant at his residence and arrested him. R. 111:65-66. Upon 
receiving his Miranda rights, defendant denied starting the fire, but admitted that he was 
at the Wells Club and Bonanza the night before. R. 111:69. Officer Nielsen obtained a 
search warrant for defendant's residence, but the ensuing search yielded no relevant 
evidence. R. 111:68-69. 
At trial, the State offered expert testimony from Lynn Borg, the Utah State Fire 
Marshal and a fire investigator for twenty-seven years. R. 111:90. After examining the 
evidence, Borg opined that the fire was deliberately set using gasoline. R. 111:91-97. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Point I: Defendant claims that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of 
counsel. This Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim because it is 
inadequately briefed. In any event, even if this court were to look past defendant's failure 
to adequately brief his claim, it is speculative and lacks merit. Defendant fails to identify 
those witnesses that he claims should have been called to testify at trial. He also fails 
show that trial counsel's strategic decision to cross-examine Officer Nielsen regarding 
defendant's prior drug use and the decision not to raise foundational objections to the 
State's expert witness were objectively deficient or prejudicial. 
Point II: Defendant next argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient 
to support his the jury's verdict. However, because defendant fails to marshal the 
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evidence in support of his conviction, his sufficiency challenge fails. Notwithstanding 
that failure, the evidence indicating that defendant was at the scene near the time the fire 
started, that he had a motive to start the fire, that he threatened to start the fire after 
purchasing a small amount of gasoline in a coffee cup, and that the fire was ignited using 
gasoline, was sufficient to show that defendant intentionally and unlawfully attempted to 
bum the Wells Club, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S 
PERFORMANCE WAS DEFICIENT FAIL BECAUSE THEY ARE 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED; IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT'S 
CLAIMS ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND FAIL TO 
MEET EITHER PRONG OF THE STRICKLAND TEST FOR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Defendant claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial on 
three grounds: (1) defense counsel neglected to call unnamed witnesses to establish an 
alibi defense and "to testify concerning what [defendant] did with the small amount of 
gasoline that he bought[;]" (2) in cross-examining the State's witness, defense counsel 
inappropriately elicited information regarding defendant's prior drug use; and (3) defense 
counsel did not raise a foundational objection as to the qualifications of the State's expert 
witness or offer rebuttal testimony from another expert witness. Br. of Aplt. at 3-6. 
Defendant's claims should not be considered because they are inadequately briefed. In 
any event, defendant's claims are unsupported by the record and fail to meet either prong 
of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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A. Defendant's claims are inadequately briefed. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924, 926 (Utah App. 1998). Rule 24 of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that "[t]he argument shall contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
Here, defendant's argument is cursory at best and fails to offer any analysis or 
support for his claims. See Br. of Aplt. at 3-6. Defendant superficially treats his three 
challenges to his trial counsel's effectiveness in only three-and-a-half pages of text. See 
id. Cf. State v. Lucero, 2002 UT App 135, ff 12-15,47 P.3d 107 (finding a single-issue 
argument consisting of only six pages to be inadequately briefed). Further, the argument 
includes only two cases collectively cited as three sentences which are only found on the 
first page. See id. Defendant provides no analysis or application of the legal principles 
contained in those cases to the present facts. See id. Instead, defendant cites instances in 
the record of his trial counsel's allegedly ineffective representation, but gives no authority 
or analysis suggesting that trial counsel's behavior "was objectively deficient" or 
prejudicial, and then broadly concludes that he is entitled to relief. See id.; State v. 
Mecham, 2000 UT App 247, f 21,9 P.3d 777. See also State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 
305 (Utah 1998) (Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald citation to authority but 
development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority."). In 
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essence, defendant impermissibly treats this Court as "'a depository in which [he] 
dump[s] the burden of argument and research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 
1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, where defendant's claims are inadequately 
briefed, they need not be addressed by this Court. See Parra, 972 P.2d at 926. 
B. Defendant's claims are unsupported by the record and lack merit. 
Even if this Court were to look past defendant's failure to adequately brief his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, they are unsupported by the record and lack 
merit. 
1. The Standard. 
To show ineffective assistance of council "a defendant must first demonstrate that 
counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment[,]" and "rebut the strong presumption that 'under the 
circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy. '" State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 19,405 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668,687-89 (1984) (additional citations omitted)). "Second, the defendant must 
show that counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial—i.e., that it affected the 
outcome of the case." Id. 
2. The record does not support defendant's claim that defense counsel 
was ineffective for neglecting to call additional witnesses at trial. 
Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for neglecting to call both lay 
and expert witnesses at trial to lend credence to his story and to offer rebuttal testimony to 
the State's expert witness, Fire Marshal Borg. Br. of Aplt. at 4. Specifically, defendant 
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claims that he gave his defense counsel "names of witnesses that could have told the jury 
that he had an alibi for the time that the fire was started, and to testify concerning what he 
did with the small amount of gasoline that he bought[,]" and that defense counsel erred by 
not offering "an expert to review the testimony of the fire marshal or to have any 
refutation of the testimony given/' Br. of Aplt. at 4, 6. Defendant fails, however, to offer 
any record support for his claims. See id. 
Defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing his counsel's ineffectiveness, by 
providing supporting arguments which cite the record. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, fflf 
11,16. "[Pjroof of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but 
must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). 
"Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or deficiencies 
resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that counsel performed 
effectively." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,117. 
Nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that he identified or conveyed 
any information concerning other witnesses to defense counsel. Absent record support, 
"defendant's [claim] stands as a unilateral allegation which the reviewing] court has no 
power to determine. [An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question that depends 
for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record." State v. Wulffenstein, 657 
P,2d 289,293 (Utah 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983). In the face of an 
inadequate record, "'this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below[,]'" 
9 
and find that defense counsel performed effectively. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 11, 17 
(citations omitted).2 
Additionally, defendant fails to identify the expert witness that he claims should 
have been called to rebut the fire marshal's testimony, or that the expert would have 
offered an opposing viewpoint. As explained, where a defendant's claim is based solely 
on speculation, his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails. See Fernandez 870 P.2d 
at 877. 
3. Defendant fails to meet his burden under Strickland with respect to his 
claim that defense counsel's cross-examination of Officer Nielsen was 
improper. 
Defendant next claims that while cross-examining Officer Nielsen, defense 
counsel inappropriately alerted the jury to defendant's prior drug use, thus negatively 
influencing the jury's impression of defendant. Br. of Aplt. at 4-5. 
In arguing ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must "prove there was a 
'lack of any conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions.'" Mecham, 2000 UT App 
247, f 22 (citation omitted). Appellate courts "'indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that 
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. (citing Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689) (citation omitted). 
defendant failed to avail himself of the remedies available to fill any gap in the 
record. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. 
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The colloquy between defense counsel and Officer Nielsen during cross-
examination supplies "a rational basis for counsel's [questions]." State v. Tennyson, 850 
P.2d 461,468 (Utah App. 1993). Specifically, defense counsel was attempting to 
illustrate Officer Nielsen's perceivable bias against defendant. See R. 111:75-77, 84-85. 
By questioning the officer about his several prior encounters with defendant at his home 
and work, defense counsel was attempting to show the jury that Officer Nielsen had 
allegedly harassed defendant on several prior occasions for no discernable reason, and 
that the instant case was merely a result of the officer's alleged bias against defendant. 
See id. See also Taylor v. Warden, 905 P.2d 277,282 (Utah 1995) ("[Appellate courts] 
give counsel wide latitude to make tactical decisions and will not question such decisions 
unless [there is] no 'reasonable basis for them.'") (citation omitted). Thus, under the first 
prong of the Strickland test, because defendant cannot "rebut the strong presumption that 
'under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy[,]"" nor show that defense counsel's "performance was deficient, in that it fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgmentf,]" his claim fails. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, J 19 (citations omitted). 
Additionally, defendant fails to show how defense counsel's questioning was 
prejudicial. Because the questioning only highlighted vague and unproven allegations 
about defendant's connection with drugs, it was innocuous. No evidence suggested that 
defendant had any involvement with drugs. See R. 111:75-77, 84-85. To the contrary, 
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the questioning suggested that defendant was not connected with drugs. See id. 
Accordingly, defendant also fails to meet the second prong of the Strickland test. 
4. Defendant's claim that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting 
to the State's expert witness and for not offering a rebuttal expert 
witness, is frivolous. 
Lastly, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective for not raising a 
foundational objection to the State's expert witness and not offering a rebuttal expert 
witness. See Br. of Aplt. at 5-6. Defendant's claim is frivolous. 
At trial, the State called Lynn Borg, the senior arson investigator for the Utah State 
Fire Marshal's Office. R. 111:89-90. Initially on direct examination, the prosecutor 
asked Borg to expound on his training and experience. R. 111:90. At that point, defense 
counsel interjected stating, "Your Honor, we have had his credentials for a while. I've 
done some checking. We're willing to stipulate that he is an expert in the field of, I 
guess, it wouldn't be starting fires, but the field of fires, whatever." Id. The court then 
agreed to accept the fire marshal's testimony as an expert in the field of arson 
investigation. Id. Following that exchange, the prosecutor briefly asked Borg how many 
years he had served as the Utah State Fire Marshal and as a fire investigator. Id. Borg 
responded that he has served nine and twenty-seven years respectively. Id. 
Where the record clearly indicates that Borg was an expert in the field of arson 
investigation, any objection to Borg as an expert witness would have been futile. See 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 26,1 P.3d 546 ("Failure to raise futile objections does not 
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel."). As revealed in the record, the nine years 
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Borg served as the Utah State Fire Marshal and the twenty-seven years he worked as an 
arson investigator undeniably support his expertise. Further, although it was not made a 
part of the record, Borg's vitae was properly received and examined by defense counsel 
and found to adequately qualify Borg as an expert of arson investigation. See id. Faced 
with Borg's lengthy list of credentials, defense counsel wisely stipulated to Borg's 
expertise in an strategic attempt to draw the jury's attention away from the prosecution's 
possible parade of Borg's extensive qualifications. R. 111:90. Accordingly, defendant 
has failed to show either that his counsel's performance fell below the standard of 
reasonable professional judgment or that it was prejudicial. See Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
% 19 (citations omitted). 
POINT II 
WHERE DEFENDANT FAILS TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AND, IN ANY EVENT, THE EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENTLY SUPPORTS THE JURY'S VERDICT, 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY 
OF THE EVIDENCE FAILS 
Defendant next claims that the evidence offered at trial was insufficient to convict 
him of attempted aggravated arson. Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. 
"[A] defendant must overcome a heavy burden in challenging the sufficiency of 
evidence for a jury verdict." State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, J 10,2 P.3d 954. 
"[An appellate court] will reverse a jury verdict only when, after viewing the evidence 
and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict, [it] find[s] that 
the evidence to support the verdict was completely lacking or was so slight and 
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unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust/' State v. Silva, 2000 
UT App 292,f 13,13 P.3d 604 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Circumstantial 
evidence alone is sufficient to support a criminal conviction. State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 
470,472 (Utah App. 1991). See also State v. Dronzank, 671 P.2d 199,200 (Utah 1983) 
("[Circumstantial] evidence may be the only way of establishing a case of [aggravated] 
arson, which usually is based on secret preparation and activity."). Accordingly, "[s]o 
long as there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of 
all the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, [an appellate court's] 
inquiry stops." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342,345 (Utah 1985). 
This Court, however, should not consider defendant's claim because he has failed 
to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. See Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A 
party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenged findings."); West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 
(Utah App. 1991) (In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, "[c]ounsel must 
extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully assume the adversary's 
position," by presenting "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the appellant 
resists."). In addition to other omitted evidence, defendant gives short shrift to the 
important fact that only minutes before buying a small amount of gasoline in a coffee cup 
and telling Lyons that he had just been "86ed" or ousted from the Wells Club, and "to 
watch, [and] in 45 minutes it's going to go up in smoke," defendant's anger at Andrews 
14 
was clearly visible through his demeanor and obscene gestures. See R. 111:14-15, 22-23, 
26-30; Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. Furthermore, defendant fails to mention the fact that defendant 
was then seen heading toward the Wells Club carrying the gasoline and that his intention 
of using the gasoline to bum the Wells Club was so obvious that immediately after 
Lyons' encounter with defendant, she telephoned the Andrews to warn her of defendant's 
devious plan. See R. 111:26-27, 30, 33-37,44, 50-51; Br. of Aplt. at 6-9. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to marshal the evidence, the evidence offered 
at trial was sufficient to support defendant's conviction of attempted aggravated arson. 
Under Utah law, to prove attempted aggravated arson the State must show that by means 
of fire or explosives, defendant intentionally and unlawfully took a substantial step 
toward damaging a habitable structure. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1999); Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999). For an act to constitute a "substantial step," it must be 
"strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-4-101 (1999). On appeal, however, defendant really only challenges the State's proof 
of his identity as the perpetrator of the crime. See Br. of Aplt at 6-9. The following 
evidence offered at trial affirmatively establishes that defendant committed attempted 
aggravated arson: 
• At trial, both Andrews and Lyons testified that they saw defendant at or 
near the scene of the crime around the time the fire was ignited. See R. 
111:12-37. 
• Defendant admitted during closing argument that he was at the Wells Club 
just prior to the fire, that he purchased a small amount of gasoline from 
Bonanza shortly after leaving the club, and that he then went to the side of 
the bank which is adjacent to the Wells Club. See R. 111:107-11. 
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Defendant also admitted to the jury that he was upset when he left the Wells 
Club. See R. 111:107-11. Moreover, Andrews testified that defendant was 
so visibly upset and agitated after being ousted from the club that he began 
jumping up and down making obscene gestures toward her and the others 
inside the club. R. 111:14-15,22-23. 
Immediately after leaving the Wells Club, defendant entered the Bonanza 
gas station, purchased 45 cents worth of gasoline, and told Lyons that he 
had just been "86ed" or ousted from the Wells Club, and "to watch, [and] in 
45 minutes it's going to go up in smoke." R. 111:26-30. Lyons also 
testified that defendant appeared visibly upset. R. 111:26-27. 
Lyons then saw defendant walk across the street and go around the back of 
the bank building adjacent to the Wells Club, carrying what appeared to be 
the gasoline he had just purchased. R. 111:26-27,30,33-37,44. Lyons 
was so concerned by defendant's behavior that she telephoned Andrews to 
issue a warning. See R. 111:27, 50-51. 
Geneal Petit, the owner of the Wells Club testified that the garbage can in 
which the fire was ignited, was always kept wired to a small fence located 
ten feet from the back of the club. R. 111:59,106-07.3 However, upon 
examining the garbage can and the scorched back wall of the club building, 
Officer Nielsen noticed that the garbage can had been untied and moved 
against the wall. R. 111:59,62-63,67-68, 75. 
Officer Nielsen found that the inside of the garbage can was charred and 
there were scorch marks above the can on the club wall. R. 111:62-65, 75. 
He also noticed a strong odor of gasoline emanating from inside the garbage 
can. R. 111:65. Consistent with the officer's findings, Kent and Bake 
testified that they noticed flames intermittently shooting up the club's back 
wall. See R. 111:38-42, 52-57. Moreover, after carefully examining the 
evidence, Fire Marshal Borg opined that the fire was deliberately set using 
gasoline. SeeR. 111:91-97,100. 
3
 Although Petit's videotaped testimony was presented to the jury and summarized 
by the prosecutor during closing argument, it was not made a part of the record on appeal. 
See R. 59. Therefore,"'[where] appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, 
this Court must assume the regularity of the proceedings below.'" Litherland, 2000 UT 
76,1 11 (citing State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1226 (Utah 1997) (additional citations 
omitted)). 
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From that evidence, the jury could reasonably identify defendant as the perpetrator 
and conclude that "there [was] some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from 
which findings of all the requisite elements of [attempted aggravated arson could] 
reasonably be made[.]" Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. See also State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 
332-33 (Utah 1991) (in aggravated arson case, sufficient evidence included defendant's 
expression of anger shortly before the fire, his presence at the scene near the time the fire 
started, and use of an accelerant in igniting the fire); State v. Showaker, 721 P.2d 892, 893 
(Utah 1986) ("substantial credible evidence" to sustain arson conviction included threat to 
cause the fire and timely opportunity)4 
4Defendant also argues that the Wells Club was not shown to be occupied at the 
time that the fire started or completely damaged by the fire. See Br. of Aplt. at 7-9. 
However, under sections 76-6-103 and 76-4-101 the State need not make that showing in 
proving that defendant committed attempted aggravated arson. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-
6-103(l)(a) (1999) (only requiring proof that the structure was "habitable"); Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-101(2) (1999) (defining a "habitable structure" as "any building . . . used for 
. . . assembling persons or conducting business whether a person is actually present or 
not"); Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (1999) (requiring proof of "conduct constituting a 
substantial step toward commission of the offense.). Here, the trial testimony clearly 
established that Andrews and others were assembled inside the Wells Club at the time the 
fire was started and that they were conducting business at that time and that there were 
scorch marks on the back wall of the club. See R. 111:12-24, 38-42, 52-58, 62-63. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction for attempted aggravated arson. 
Dated this ff)^ day of January, 2003. 
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ADDENDA 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 1. PROPERTY DESTRUCTION 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-6-103 Aggravated arson. 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the offense 
is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 4. INCHOATE OFFENSES 
PART 1. ATTEMPT 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-4-101 Attempt —Elements of offense. 
(1) For purposes of this part a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime 
if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense. 
(2) For purposes of this part, conduct does not constitute a substantial step 
unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's intent to commit the offense. 
(3) No defense to the offense of attempt shall arise: 
(a) because the offense attempted was actually committed; or 
(b) due to factual or legal impossibility if the offense could have been 
committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be. 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 76. UTAH CRIMINAL CODE 
CHAPTER 6. OFFENSES AGAINST PROPERTY 
PART 1. PROPERTY DESTRUCTION 
Copyright © 2002 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the 
LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. 
Current through the 2002 5th Special Session 
76-6-101 Definitions. 
For purposes of this chapter: 
(1) "Property" means any form of real property or tangible personal property 
which is capable of being damaged or destroyed and includes a habitable structure. 
(2) "Habitable structure" means any building, vehicle, trailer, railway car, 
aircraft, or watercraft used for lodging or assembling persons or conducting 
business whether a person is actually present or not. 
(3) "Property" is that of another, if anyone other than the actor has a 
possessory or proprietary interest in any portion thereof. 
(4) "Value" means: 
(a) The market value of the property, if totally destroyed, at the time and place 
of the offense, or where cost of replacement exceeds the market value; or 
(b) Where the market value cannot be ascertained, the cost of repairing or 
replacing the property within a reasonable time following the offense. 
(5) If the property damaged has a value that cannot be ascertained by the 
criteria set forth in Subsections (a) and (b) above, the property shall be deemed 
to have a value less than $300. 
